{"id":184,"date":"2018-09-17T12:47:50","date_gmt":"2018-09-17T17:47:50","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/?page_id=184"},"modified":"2020-03-23T15:09:02","modified_gmt":"2020-03-23T20:09:02","slug":"article-17","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/article-17\/","title":{"rendered":"Article 17"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

BELIEF: AN OWNER\u2019S MANUAL<\/strong>
\nARTICLE 17<\/strong>
\nTHE PERIODIC TABLE <\/strong>
\nAND AMBIGUITY-VIEWPOINT INTERACTIONS<\/strong>
\nIN INFORMATIVE BELIEFS <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As you may remember, I proposed in Article 1 that beliefs are best considered cognitive tools. I also suggested that they serve us well if they provide the guidance we rely on them for and poorly if they fail to do so. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Articles 2-16, we explored some of the straightforward implications of that perspective. We learned to distinguish informative beliefs from reassuring beliefs and to determine whether we treat our beliefs as informative or reassuring. We learned to distinguish beliefs of varying degrees of ambiguity and to determine how ambiguous we assume our beliefs to be. We learned to identify the viewpoints of our beliefs and the viewpoints we assume our beliefs occupy. And we learned about the consequences of the errors we make when we fail to attend to each of these characteristics.

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN NEED, AMBIGUITY, AND VIEWPOINT<\/strong>

But there\u2019s a subtler source of error than inattention to those individual characteristics: inattention to their interactions.\u00a0The Periodic Table of the Beliefs<\/em>, which I will send you upon request, was designed to draw attention to those interactions. (Please send requests for this document to barnet.feingold@hotmail.com.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PERIODIC TABLE OF THE BELIEFS<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Periodic Table of the Beliefs<\/em> has five horizontal rows and eight vertical columns.\nIn theory, it has forty cells, each of which serves as home to beliefs\nfulfilling one of two needs in one of five viewpoints with one of four degrees\nof precision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Periodic Table of the Beliefs<\/em>\u00a0locates informative beliefs on its left-hand side and reassuring beliefs on its right-hand side. Cells that provide homes to informative precise beliefs are at the leftmost edge of the table, while cells that provide homes to reassuring precise beliefs are at the table\u2019s rightmost edge. Cells that are home to imprecise beliefs are immediately inboard of cells that are home to precise beliefs, while cells that are home to rules of thumb are immediately inboard of cells that are home to imprecise beliefs. Cells serving as home to informative catalytic narratives are to the left of the table\u2019s center. Cells serving as home to comforting catalytic are to the right of the table\u2019s center. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Viewpoints are arranged in the same manner on the left\n(informative) and right (reassuring) sides of the table. In both cases, the\nExistential Viewpoint provides the foundation, the Realist Viewpoint is immediately\nabove the Existential Viewpoint, and the Ethical, Visionary, and Quest and\nCommitment Viewpoints are arranged, in that order, above the Existential\nViewpoint. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The guidance that beliefs proper to each of the table\u2019s\nforty cells supplies is the result of the primary qualities associated with\nneed, viewpoint, and precision and the interactions of those qualities. This\narticle and those that follow will describe those interactions, point out the\nerrors that occur when those interactions are overlooked, and describe\ncharacteristics of The Periodic Table<\/em> that draw attention to those\ninteractions. These errors affect informative beliefs differently than\nreassuring beliefs. As such, I have chosen to devote this article to the\neffects of those errors on informative beliefs. I\u2019ll be examining the impact of\nthose errors on reassuring beliefs in Article 18. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

CONSEQUENCES OF NEGLECTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN\nAMBIGUITY AND VIEWPOINT IN INFORMATIVE BELIEFS   <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first error we\u2019ll be exploring occurs when we neglect\nthe inherent ambiguity of higher-viewpoint informative beliefs. To make this\neasier to understand, let\u2019s return to the drunken driving example from Article\n14. As you may recall, the informative Realist Viewpoint belief about drunken\ndriving was, \u201cWhile, in 2009, a little over two percent of drivers were found\nto be intoxicated, over a third of those who died in vehicular accidents tested\npositive for alcohol.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This Realist Viewpoint belief is (allegedly) a\nstraightforward fact. It\u2019s a precise belief about the nature of reality because\nit implicitly predicts that if the data collection procedures that produced\nthat fact were repeated, they would yield nearly the same (precise) result. Those\nsame data could also give rise to imprecise beliefs like, \u201cDrunken drivers are\nmore likely to die in traffic accidents.\u201d They could inspire rules of thumb\nlike \u201cIf you drink, don\u2019t drive.\u201d Or they could motivate catalytic narratives \u2013\nstories about drinking-related tragedies. Thus, as you can see, the Realist\nViewpoint can host beliefs of any degree of ambiguity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The informative Ethical Viewpoint belief about drunken driving \u2013 \u201cThe number of persons who drive under the influence of drugs and alcohol is intolerable.\u201d \u2013 cannot be reasonably translated as a precise prediction. The least ambiguous belief that can be derived from that statement is, \u201cA majority of persons (or perhaps a majority of moral authorities) are likely to consider the prevalence of intoxicated driving to be a disgrace.\u201d That statement, in a manner typical of imprecise beliefs, divides reality into a small number of categories \u2013 in this case, the disgraceful and the bearable. This example illustrates the principle that imprecise beliefs are the least ambiguous beliefs the Ethical Viewpoint is capable of hosting. Nothing prevents the Ethical Viewpoint from hosting rules of thumb (value-laden sayings about drinking and driving) or catalytic narratives (value-laden stories about the consequences of driving while intoxicated).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The informative Visionary Viewpoint belief about drunken\ndriving \u2013 \u201cThe world would be better if drunken driving were less frequent\u201d \u2013\ndraws attention to a significant issue without suggesting what might make\nthings better. It makes neither precise nor imprecise predictions, functioning,\nrather, as a rule of thumb. Despite my best efforts, I have been unable to\ngenerate a Visionary Viewpoint belief that breaks this ambiguity barrier. I\ntherefore humbly propose that rules of thumb are the least ambiguous beliefs\nthe Visionary Viewpoint is capable of hosting. The Visionary Viewpoint can, of\ncourse, host catalytic narratives \u2013 inspiring stories about a world free of\ndrunken drivers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, the Quest and Commitment Viewpoint belief about\ndrunken driving \u2013 \u201cI\u2019m obliged to do my best to reduce DUI\u201d \u2013 describes the\nsort of person the believer wishes to be. Since, from a committed believer\u2019s\npoint of view, that choice cannot be wrong, the answer to the question, \u201cWhat\nam I called upon to do to achieve the improvement or perfection I envision?\u201d is\nunfalsifiable. And, of course, Existential Viewpoint beliefs, which, through\nour choices, create \u201ctruth\u201d and \u201cvalue,\u201d are also unfalsifiable (and thus\ncatalytic).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In sum, the questions that higher-viewpoint beliefs address\nrender such beliefs more ambiguous than lower-viewpoint beliefs. The precision\nof Positivist Viewpoint beliefs is unlimited. Ethical Viewpoint beliefs can be\nno more exacting than imprecise beliefs. The precision of Visionary Viewpoint\nbeliefs cannot exceed that of rules of thumb. And neither Quest and Commitment\nnor Existential Viewpoint beliefs can be any more precise than catalytic\nnarratives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, we inevitably err when we (a) treat\nan Ethical Viewpoint belief as if its guidance were as valuable or trustworthy\nas that of a precise belief, (b) treat a Visionary Viewpoint belief as if its\nguidance were as valuable or trustworthy as that of either a precise or imprecise\nbelief, or (c) treat a Quest and Commitment Viewpoint or an Existential\nViewpoint belief as if its guidance were as valuable or trustworthy as that of\na rule of thumb, an imprecise belief, or a precise belief.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The implications of this line of reasoning are portrayed\non The Periodic Table of the Beliefs<\/em> by blackened cells. That\nblackening indicates that such cells are proper to beliefs that are more\nprecise than their viewpoints allow. As such, they are unpopulated. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

CONSEQUENCES OF NEGLECTING THE AMBIGUITY OF LOWER-VIEWPOINT\nBELIEFS ON WHICH HIGHER-VIEWPOINT BELIEFS ARE BASED<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Neglecting the limited precision of allegedly informative\nhigher-viewpoint beliefs leads us to place more faith in them than they merit.\nThat\u2019s a significant error in and of itself. But there\u2019s another common\noversight that intensifies that error: blindness to the fact that the precision\nof informative higher-viewpoint beliefs is limited by the precision of the\nlower-viewpoint informative beliefs upon which they depend. To use an example\nI\u2019ve used before, imagine that you\u2019ve heard some negative (Realist Viewpoint)\nthings about a relative\u2019s lover. If those rumors are specific and falsifiable,\nyour (Ethical Viewpoint) conviction that this relationship bodes ill for your\nrelative is likely to be an imprecise belief. On the other hand, if that\n(Realist Viewpoint) rumor is vague and unfalsifiable, your (Ethical Viewpoint)\njudgments about the goodness of your relative\u2019s relationship are necessarily\nuncertain (i.e., rules of thumb or catalytic narratives).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

More precisely, if Realist Viewpoint \u201cfacts\u201d about any issue are rules of thumb, those \u201cfacts\u201d cannot legitimately be used to justify Ethical Viewpoint beliefs about the goodness of current realities. If, as in the example above, Realist Viewpoint \u201cfacts\u201d are catalytic narratives, those \u201cfacts\u201d cannot legitimately support anything but other such narratives in the Ethical, Visionary, and Quest and Commitment viewpoints. Similarly, Ethical Viewpoint beliefs in the form of catalytic narratives can support nothing but equally ambiguous narratives in higher viewpoints. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Periodic Table of the Beliefs<\/em> hints at this reality through its arrangement of viewpoints and classes of precision. However, it relies on users to remember that higher-viewpoint informative beliefs can properly occupy cells directly above or to the more ambiguous side of lower-viewpoint beliefs that support them \u2013 never to the more precise side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ignoring this issue renders us vulnerable to confidently\nmaking baseless judgments about good and evil. Equally seriously, it renders us\nvulnerable to committing ourselves to Utopian visions as if their promises were\nclear and realizable, even though the beliefs that underlie such visions deserve\nno more confidence than rules of thumb or catalytic narratives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

BROKEN EGGS, OMELETS, AND OUTRAGE<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

I find the statement, \u201cYou have to break some eggs to make an omelet,\u201d maddening. Such a \u00a0statement, of course, is intended to portray the harm done in pursuit of Visionary\/Quest and Commitment Viewpoint goals as unavoidable and inconsequential. But it\u2019s full of hidden assumptions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, it assumes that the goal, like an omelet, is familiar\nand that the speaker has a detailed vision of the reality he or she wishes to\nachieve. Second, it assumes that the process of attaining that goal, like the\nprocess of making an omelet, is well-understood and oft-replicated. Third, it\nassumes that the speaker possesses the skills, tools, and resources needed to\nachieve his\/her goals. Finally, it assumes that whatever may be harmed is as\ninconsequential and unfeeling as an unfertilized egg.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the pursuit of Visionary\/Quest and Commitment Viewpoint goals violates every one of these assumptions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, advocates of such goals cannot have clear, detailed, comprehensive visions of the realities their proposed actions might create. Such actions, after all, inevitably lead us into\u00a0terra incognita<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, the processes by which Visionary Viewpoint\/Quest and Commitment goals are pursued are necessarily novel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Third, the novelty of those processes precludes verifiable\nexpertise and makes it impossible to know whether the tools and resources\nneeded to achieve one\u2019s goals are available.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, although visionaries may be blind to the humanity\nof those with no place in their plans, the \u201cinfidels,\u201d  \u201ccounterrevolutionaries,\u201d and \u201csoulless brutes\u201d\nthey are willing to sacrifice in pursuit of their Utopian visions are sentient\nand precious. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Additionally, it\u2019s clear that knowledge of what God wants is\nrare, and there\u2019s no way to know who has it. As such, it\u2019s safest to assume\nthat no one possesses such knowledge and that those who claim to are\ndangerously overconfident.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s also clear that, despite our grand visions, no one has created a paradise on Earth. Although we have the tools to break all the eggs we want to, we don\u2019t have the means to turn them into anything edible. All of our purges, slaughters, holocausts, genocides, inquisitions, show trials, jihads \u2013 these and all the other horrors we\u2019ve committed in pursuit of heavens on Earth \u2013 have created immeasurable suffering without once having created the beatific realities they promised. Contemplating this dolorous reality, I am reminded of graffiti found, in 1991, on a statue of Karl Marx in Moscow: \u201cWorkers of the World, I am sorry.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tragically, Utopians find it easy to believe that their dreams are well-grounded, realistic, and achievable \u2013 that they can make their dreams real and that those dreams, when realized, will be every bit as wondrous as they imagine. That belief has justified all too much havoc, suffering, terror, and slaughter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ungrounded, misleading Utopian visions can be personal, too.\nI recall a wealthy medical specialist who decided his life would be perfect if\nhe were wealthier. Thinking that multi-level marketing was the key to riches,\nhe came to view conversations as opportunities to enlarge his multi-level\nmarketing pyramid rather than as opportunities to engage in meaningful\ninteraction. Ultimately, he alienated his colleagues by inviting them to his home for a \u201cparty\u201d that was, in reality, a\nmulti-level marketing presentation. If he\u2019d been more appreciative of\nwhat he had and more realistic about his dreams, he might not have wasted so\nmuch time or squandered so much goodwill.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

THE EFFECT OF BIASED LOWER-VIEWPOINT BELIEFS ON THE VALIDITY\nOF CONTINGENT HIGHER-VIEWPOINT BELIEFS: A BRIEF STUDY IN IRONY<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

There\u2019s another error resulting from inattention to the interaction of ambiguity and viewpoint in\u00a0informative beliefs: blindness to the ways that beliefs can discredit themselves.

As we know, the validity of higher-viewpoint informative beliefs depends upon the validity of the lower-viewpoint beliefs that inspire them. You can\u2019t make a valid judgment about whether something\u2019s good unless you have an accurate grasp of what it is. You can\u2019t make a valid judgment about what might be better unless you have a reasonable grasp of goodness. And so on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consequently, any allegedly informative higher-viewpoint\nbelief that biases the lower-viewpoint beliefs that underlie it (thereby\ncompromising their accuracy) is self-discrediting! Such beliefs are like\nskyscrapers whose upper floors are made of material pilfered from their\nfoundations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Imagine that someone\u2019s Quest and Commitment Viewpoint\nbeliefs render them passionate about bringing a particular political program to\nfruition. If that commitment leads them to (a) create unrealistically rosy\n(Visionary Viewpoint) scenarios about the joy and justice that program could\nbring about, to (b) exaggerate the (Ethical Viewpoint) injustice and oppression\nof the realities the proposed program promises to remedy, or to (c) distort\ndata to support their dark vision of contemporary life, their Quest and\nCommitment Viewpoint beliefs about their obligation to realize their Utopian\nvision are unworthy of respect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The vertical arrangement of viewpoints in The\nPeriodic Table of the Beliefs<\/em> is intended to remind you of the degree\nto which higher-viewpoint informative beliefs rely on lower-viewpoint\ninformative beliefs . . .  and that it\u2019s\nas wrong-headed to support higher-viewpoint beliefs with biased lower-viewpoint\nbeliefs as it is to build a skyscraper on an unstable foundation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

EFFECTS OF INDIFFERENCE TO LOWER-VIEWPOINT BELIEFS THAT\nGROUND  HIGHER-VIEWPOINT BELIEFS <\/strong>
\n
\nOne final question about the relationship between lower-viewpoint and\ncontingent higher-viewpoint beliefs remains unanswered: \u201cWhat is the status of\nhigher-viewpoint beliefs whose believers neglect the lower-viewpoint beliefs on which\nthey\u2019re contingent?\u201d As you\u2019ll see below, it\u2019s advisable to view such beliefs as\ncatalytic narratives. Here\u2019s the line of reasoning that leads to that\nconclusion:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. Believers who neglect the lower-viewpoint beliefs that,\nin theory, ground a higher-viewpoint belief inevitably neglect the\nfalsifiability of those lower-viewpoint beliefs.
\n2. Thus, such believers no answer to the question, \u201cIf I were wrong, how would\nI know?\u201d
\n3. As we learned in Article 11, beliefs for which such questions have no answer\noperate as catalytic narratives.
\n4. But, as we just discovered, the precision of higher-viewpoint beliefs is\nlimited by the precision of the lower-viewpoint beliefs on which they\u2019re built.\n
\n5. As such, when believers fail to examine the lower-viewpoint beliefs that\nground their higher-viewpoint beliefs, they transform those higher-viewpoint\nbeliefs \u2013 whatever their apparent precision \u2013 into catalytic narratives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

EXERCISE 17<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reread this article, frequently referring\nto The Periodic Table of the Beliefs<\/em>. Wherever possible, generate\nand document examples of the principles discussed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

BELIEF: AN OWNER\u2019S MANUAL ARTICLE 17 THE PERIODIC TABLE  AND AMBIGUITY-VIEWPOINT INTERACTIONS IN INFORMATIVE BELIEFS  As you may remember, I proposed in Article 1 that beliefs are best considered cognitive tools. I also suggested that they serve us well if they provide the guidance we rely on them for and poorly if they fail to … Continue reading “Article 17”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-184","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/184","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=184"}],"version-history":[{"count":15,"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/184\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":959,"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/184\/revisions\/959"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=184"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}