{"id":58,"date":"2018-06-26T14:09:10","date_gmt":"2018-06-26T19:09:10","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/?page_id=58"},"modified":"2019-12-18T07:31:14","modified_gmt":"2019-12-18T12:31:14","slug":"article-5","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/article-5\/","title":{"rendered":"Article 5"},"content":{"rendered":"

BELIEF: AN OWNER\u2019S MANUAL<\/strong>
\nARTICLE 5<\/strong>
\nPRECISION:<\/strong>
\nTHE SECOND OF THREE CHARACTERISTICS<\/strong>
\nTHAT AFFECT THE GUIDANCE<\/strong>
\nBELIEFS PROVIDE<\/strong><\/p>\n

The second characteristic that must be considered if we are to know how effectively a belief serves its believers is its precision. More specifically, determining how well the belief functions as a cognitive tool requires identifying both (1) our assumptions about the precision of the belief\u2019s guidance and (2) the precision of the guidance the belief actually provides.<\/p>\n

The precision of a belief\u2019s predictions is determined by two factors: the proportion of possible observations that are inconsistent with those predictions and the ease with which predictive failures can be \u201cexplained away.\u201d<\/p>\n

ROULETTE WAGERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PRECISION<\/strong><\/p>\n

The bets one can place at a roulette table can be used to illustrate the first of these factors. American roulette wheels have 38 pockets (numbered 1-36, 0, and 00) in which a small ball can come to rest. Gamblers at the roulette table can bet on a wide variety of predictions \u2013 from the very precise prediction that the ball will come to rest in a specific pocket to the much less precise prediction that the ball will land on an even (or, alternatively, odd) numbered pocket. Those who place a precise bet (i.e., on a particular number) are likely to be wrong about 97% of the time, while those who place a less precise bet (i.e., on even or odd) are likely to be wrong only 54% of the time.<\/p>\n

FOUR CLASSES OF PRECISION<\/strong><\/p>\n

Unfortunately, the precision of beliefs that guide us in most areas of our lives is less obvious and harder to calculate than the precision of roulette wagers. In the interest of making this issue easier to think about and discuss, I\u2019ve divided beliefs into four classes based on the precision of predictions they inspire: precise beliefs, imprecise beliefs, rules of thumb, and catalytic narratives.<\/p>\n

PRECISE BELIEFS<\/p>\n

Precise beliefs make definite predictions like those common to physics, engineering, and technology. The precision of some such predictions is embodied in equations that make explicit claims regarding relationships between and among phenomena, often written in mathematical form and incorporating an \u201c=\u201d sign (e.g., F=ma; E=mc\u00b2; pV=K). Precise predictions can also be found in tables of material properties and well-written technical and owners\u2019 manuals.<\/p>\n

Precise beliefs allow believers to predict what is going to happen under well-specified conditions with a high degree of certainty; and their second-order precepts encourage believers to be skeptical of untestable explanations for failure.<\/p>\n

If precise beliefs consistently inspire accurate predictions, they provide believers with valuable assistance in achieving their goals. Generally, beliefs of this class provide guidance that, if followed, makes it likely that competent believers will achieve their aims.<\/p>\n

Precise beliefs are relatively unlikely to mislead believers. This is because precise beliefs are immune to one of humanity’s most common errors \u2013 the error of treating beliefs as if they merited the sort of confidence appropriate only to more-precise beliefs. Still, as observers of scientific practice like Kuhn (1962), Mitroff (1974), and Mahoney (2004) have observed, even adherents of precise beliefs (like scientists) are subject to bias.<\/p>\n

IMPRECISE BELIEFS<\/p>\n

While precise beliefs can be extraordinarily useful, they are relevant to only a small percentage of day-to-day decisions. In many areas of our lives, our most valuable guidance comes from beliefs like those that characterize the social sciences. Such beliefs inspire \u201cdirectional predictions\u201d\u2013 the kind of predictions that lead believers to expect that if they have more of something (say, self-esteem), they’re likely to have more (or less) of something else (say, academic performance). Such predictions don\u2019t tell believers how much performance will change with specific changes in self-esteem, just that the two move in the same direction (or, alternatively, in opposite directions). And they don\u2019t lead believers to expect the specified relationship to hold consistently, just more often than not. In addition, second-order precepts associated with imprecise beliefs lead believers to give the benefit of the doubt to speculative explanations for failures and exceptions, thus insulating such beliefs from falsification.<\/p>\n

Generally, beliefs of this class provide guidance that, if followed, has a fair chance of increasing your odds of achieving your aims. When employing the guidance of an imprecise belief, it is usually advisable to remember that it may be of modest value.<\/p>\n

Beliefs of this class can mislead us if we (1) treat them as if their guidance were more reliable than it is or (2) assume — falsely — that acting in accordance with their guidance will make it likely we\u2019ll achieve our aims rather than assuming — accurately — that acting in accordance with their guidance will improve our odds of success. Those accepting the guidance of such beliefs are generally advised to do so tentatively.<\/p>\n

There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Some imprecise beliefs \u2013 like the belief that one\u2019s performance will be enhanced by confidence-inducing exercises and practices \u2013 work most effectively if wholeheartedly embraced.<\/p>\n

RULES OF THUMB<\/p>\n

Rules of thumb are more ambiguous than imprecise beliefs. This category includes a broad range of rough-and-ready guidelines like, \u201cWhen you\u2019re trout fishing, move to another spot if you don\u2019t catch anything after seven casts,\u201d \u201cIf someone fails to maintain eye contact when you\u2019re explaining something, they don\u2019t believe you,\u201d \u201cOne\u2019s experience is generally representative of reality,\u201d and \u201cIf you\u2019re having trouble understanding an abstract problem, try examining a concrete example.\u201d Rules of thumb also include proverbs like \u201cTwo heads are better than one,\u201d \u201cLook before you leap,\u201d and \u201cAbsence makes the heart grow fonder.\u201d<\/p>\n

Rules of thumb provide only colloquial descriptions of the phenomena they address and are often vague about the conditions under which relationships between those phenomena hold. In fact, many rules of thumb (like \u201cLook before you leap.\u201d and \u201cHe who hesitates is lost.\u201d) contradict one another.<\/p>\n

Rules of thumb merely hint at predictions, allowing believers to interpret them freely and making it easy to give them credit when the tactics they inspire succeed. For example, it\u2019s easy to view improvements in a relationship after discussions with a friend as supporting the notion that \u201cTwo heads are better than one.\u201d<\/p>\n

On the other hand, second-order precepts associated with rules of thumb encourage those whom they mislead to explain away exceptions and failures. It\u2019s easy to imagine someone saying something like, \u201cI thought that Ellen would be able to help me figure out how to smooth things over with my girlfriend. You know, \u2018Two heads are better than one.\u2019 But her advice just made things worse. I should have thought about the problems she\u2019s had in relationships before asking for her opinion.\u201d<\/p>\n

But despite their imprecision, rules of thumb can encourage believers to think about issues that may be relevant to problems they are dealing with. Generally, beliefs of this class provide guidance that encourages you to think about issues that are likely to matter without telling you how to achieve your goals.<\/p>\n

Beliefs of this class mislead us when we treat them as if their guidance helps us achieve our goals rather than as inspiring us to attend to issues that may matter. My experience suggests that this is a common error. After all,\u00a0 we rarely view the things we believe as simply encouraging us to think about certain issues.<\/p>\n

CATALYTIC NARRATIVES<\/p>\n

I refer to beliefs that make the most imprecise predictions as \u201ccatalytic narratives.\u201d A catalytic narrative is simply a communication \u2013 of any length and in any medium \u2013 that inspires a view of one or more phenomena without making a clearly falsifiable prediction about those phenomena or their relationships. Catalytic narratives don\u2019t convey meaningful information about the way things are or how to get things done. Rather, they shape believers\u2019 vision and judgment in ways that lead believers to experience their claims as unquestionable truths.<\/p>\n

Catalytic narratives may come in the form of prejudicial statements (like \u201cMembers of religion X are enemies of God\u201d), compelling images (even if Photoshopped), \u201cstories\u201d (like novels, sacred texts, movies, plays, editorials, documentaries, and the literatures of academic disciplines), compelling words or phrases (like \u201cracist,\u201d \u201csexist,\u201d \u201cbigot,\u201d \u201cdead white male,\u201d \u201cundocumented worker,\u201d \u201cillegal alien,\u201d \u201cepistemological privilege,\u201d \u201cfake news,\u201d \u201csocial justice,\u201d and defamatory descriptions ending in \u201cphobe\u201d). They can be descriptions that make no explicit predictions (like \u201cReligion Y is a religion of peace\u201d or \u201cIt takes a loathsome person to vote for candidate Z\u201d) and are open to widely varying interpretations.<\/p>\n

Catalytic narratives strip believers of the capacity to critically consider their (that is, such narratives\u2019) limitations and flaws. By doing so, they render believers unresponsive to data that, from an outsider\u2019s point of view, should provoke doubt. Thus, a person who\u2019s secure in her belief that supporters of candidate Z are loathsome (a belief that, while falsifiable in theory, may be resistant to falsification in practice) is likely to overlook or explain away her beloved mother\u2019s support of that candidate.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s easy to tell if a belief qualifies as a catalytic narrative. All you need do is ask a believer, \u201cHow would you know if this belief were wrong?\u201d If the believer is incapable of answering that question or denies that error is possible (even if an answer to that question is evident to unbelievers), the belief is, for that person,catalytic.<\/p>\n

Although catalytic narratives make no predictions, their power to explain events after they occur is limited only by the vagueness of their language and their believers\u2019 passion, imagination and rhetorical skill.<\/p>\n

Reverend Jerry Falwell\u2019s 1983 explanation of the AIDS epidemic exemplifies both the predictive impotence and the explanatory power of catalytic narratives. \u201cAIDS,\u201d Falwell said, \u201cis not just God\u2019s punishment for homosexuals, it is God\u2019s punishment for the society that tolerates homosexuals.\u201d Reverend Falwell was silent as to God\u2019s treatment of those infected by transfusions, the babies of AIDS-infected mothers, those infected by HIV-positive rapists, and other innocents.<\/p>\n

While Reverend Falwell asserted that God will punish homosexuals and homosexual-tolerant societies, he made no predictions regarding the nature or timing of that punishment. As such, his claim could never be shown to be wrong. And since bad things of some sort happen to all individuals and groups sooner or later, Reverend Falwell and those who believed him were guaranteed to have evidence of God\u2019s loathing for homosexuals and those who tolerate them eventually. All they needed to do was wait.<\/p>\n

Catalytic narratives receive additional protection from believers\u2019 attitudes toward both their \u201cfailures\u201d and \u201csuccesses.\u201d Believers for whom the guidance that catalytic narratives inspire doesn\u2019t \u201cwork\u201d are likely to explain those failures in ways that protect their beliefs. On the other hand, believers are likely to view helpful (or apparently helpful) guidance derived from such narratives as evidence of their truth.<\/p>\n

When assumed to be sources of practical guidance,\u00a0catalytic narratives appear to provide us with profound understandings of broad swaths of reality. But they do so only because they are consistent with almost all outcomes and immune to almost all challenges. They appear rich in wisdom only because they are bereft of content. When we use catalytic narratives to help achieve palpable goals, we use the wrong tool for the job.<\/p>\n

This is not to say that catalytic narratives are meaningless, only that they do not offer the sort of guidance they appear to. While they do not inform us about reality, they shape the way we see it. As such, we can evaluate them by asking the question, \u201cDo I wish to be the kind of person my catalytic narratives encourage me to be?\u201d<\/p>\n

At first glance, that question appears to invite answers that are not only subjective but, in many cases, tautological. However, as you\u2019ll discover in the articles that follow, there are incontrovertible criteria by which those answers can be evaluated. Indeed, some catalytic narratives warp the perception, thought, and behavior of believers so severely that only the Devil would (and does) endorse them.<\/p>\n

In the interest of increasing your sensitivity to the precision of your beliefs, this website offers techniques for identifying the precision of the guidance you assume your beliefs offer and the precision of the guidance your beliefs actually offer. It also offers techniques that can help you assess the effects of errors.<\/p>\n

EXERCISE 5A:<\/span><\/strong>
\nINCREASING YOUR AWARENESS <\/span><\/strong>
\nOF THE PRECISION OF YOUR BELIEFS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Choose one or two practice beliefs you view as \u201cinformative\u201d and one or two beliefs you view as \u201ccomforting.\u201d If you don\u2019t view any of the practice beliefs you identified during Exercise 2 as falling into one or the other of these classes, repeat Exercise 2 with an eye toward discovering beliefs you may have overlooked. \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

1) Designate each belief electronically or on paper.\u00a0 \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

2) Ask yourself whether the belief in question . . .\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

a) makes specific predictions about the future or the results of your actions (i.e., functions as a precise belief) <\/span>
\nb) makes directional predictions about the future or the likely results of your actions (i.e., functions as an imprecise belief) <\/span>
\nc) encourages you to think about the issue at hand while making no concrete predictions about the future or the likely results of your actions (i.e., functions as a rule of thumb)<\/span>
\nd) explains events after they occur while offering no predictions that might prove wrong or guidance that might prove ineffective (i.e., functions as a catalytic narrative).\u00a0 If the belief is a catalytic narrative, it may be useful to rephrase it in the form, “This (i.e., the matter you’re attempting to understand) is like that (the matter the catalytic narrative identifies as paradigmatic).”<\/span><\/p>\n

EXERCISE 5B:<\/span><\/strong>
\nINCREASING AWARENESS<\/span><\/strong>
\nOF YOUR ASSUMPTIONS <\/span><\/strong>
\nABOUT THE PRECISION <\/span><\/strong>
\nOF YOUR BELIEFS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

For each of the practice beliefs examined in EXERCISE 5A, above . . .<\/span><\/p>\n

1) Reflect on whether you assume<\/strong><\/em> that the belief . . . <\/span><\/p>\n

a) provides guidance that, if followed, makes it likely you\u2019ll achieve your aims (i.e., whether you assume that it offers the guidance of a precise belief)<\/span>
\nb) provides guidance that, if followed, increases the chance that you\u2019ll achieve your goals \u2013 but doesn\u2019t make it likely that you\u2019d do so (i.e., whether you assume that it offers the guidance of an imprecise belief) <\/span>
\nc) encourages you to attend to issues that it may be worthwhile to think about without providing guidance about what\u2019s likely to happen or how to achieve your goals (i.e., whether you assume that it offers the guidance of a rule of thumb) <\/span>
\nd) shapes your values and\/or views of reality without providing guidance that helps you achieve your goals (i.e., whether you assume that it offers the guidance of a catalytic narrative)<\/span><\/p>\n

2) What thoughts and feelings did you experience while doing this exercise?<\/span><\/p>\n

REFERENCES<\/span><\/p>\n

Festinger, L., Riecken, H. W., & Schachter, S. (1956). When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Study of a Modern Group that Predicted the Destruction of the World. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.<\/p>\n

Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.<\/p>\n

Mahoney, M. J. (2004). Scientist as Subject: The Psychological Imperative (rev. ed.). Clinton Corners, NY: Percheron Press.<\/p>\n

Merton, R. K. (1948). The Self-Fulfilling Prophesy. The Antioch Review, 198-210.<\/p>\n

Mitroff, I. (1974). The Subjective Side of Science. Amsterdam: Elsevier.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

BELIEF: AN OWNER\u2019S MANUAL ARTICLE 5 PRECISION: THE SECOND OF THREE CHARACTERISTICS THAT AFFECT THE GUIDANCE BELIEFS PROVIDE The second characteristic that must be considered if we are to know how effectively a belief serves its believers is its precision. More specifically, determining how well the belief functions as a cognitive tool requires identifying both … Continue reading “Article 5”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-58","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/58","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=58"}],"version-history":[{"count":25,"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/58\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":910,"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/58\/revisions\/910"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/barneysplace.net\/site\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=58"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}