BELIEF: AN OWNER’S MANUAL
ARTICLE 10
A CLOSER LOOK AT AMBIGUITY
PART 3:
IMPRECISE BELIEFS
CHARACTERISTICS OF “IMPRECISE BELIEFS”
Somewhat more ambiguous than precise beliefs are beliefs that, in some ways, resemble the theories of the biological and social sciences. I refer to them as “imprecise beliefs.” Such beliefs make directional predictions (e.g., that X will either increase or decrease as Y increases).
Imprecise beliefs are consistent with a wide range of observations. Since their predictions are directional rather than specific, all they say is, “If you have more of something (say, students’ self-esteem), you’re likely to have more of something else (say, academic performance).” As such, even if the phenomena they’re concerned with are unrelated, imprecise beliefs are likely to make correct predictions almost half the time.
Unlike precise beliefs, which meticulously specify the phenomena they address and the conditions under which predicted relationships between those phenomena hold, imprecise beliefs describe only the general nature of purportedly related phenomena and the conditions under which relationships between those phenomena are expected. And unlike precise beliefs, which lead believers to expect that specified relationships will consistently hold under specified conditions, imprecise beliefs lead believers to expect that specified relationships will hold most – but not all – of the time. For all these reasons, it’s easier to overlook errors of imprecise beliefs than those of precise beliefs.
Since the phenomena and conditions that imprecise beliefs address can be defined in a wide variety of ways and relationships between those phenomena are both vague and unreliable, believers can cherry-pick results that support views they favor. For example, since self-esteem can be measured in various ways, those who’re sympathetic to the idea that self-esteem improves academic performance can cite results that support that view while dismissing results that challenge it by endorsing operational definitions used in studies whose outcomes support their favored hypothesis while criticizing operational definitions used in studies whose outcomes contravene that hypothesis. Given this view of negative results, it is not surprising that second-order precepts associated with imprecise beliefs do little to encourage the promulgation of challenging facts and arguments.
In addition, imprecise beliefs incorporate second-order precepts that encourage believers to defend their beliefs against challenging observations while professing commitment to openness and integrity. Furthermore, precepts associated with such beliefs lead believers to accept speculative after-the-fact explanations of predictive failures and other events that appear to challenge the belief without requiring those explanations to serve as independent variables in further tests.
Perhaps because imprecise beliefs are inherently vague, their second-order precepts encourage a laissez-faire attitude towards revisiting their findings when more sensitive instruments and procedures become available.
Thus, imprecise beliefs are moderately ambiguous. The wide range of observations with which such beliefs are consistent, in combination with second-order precepts that a) discourage increased predictive precision, b) encourage believers to make light of critiques, c) downplay predictive failures, and d) encourage uncritical attitudes toward explanations for challenging data make it hard for believers to acknowledge the limitations and failings of their imprecise beliefs. All these factors add to the difficulty of recognizing that incorrect beliefs are wrong.
HOW TO TELL WHETHER A BELIEVER VIEWS A BELIEF AS “IMPRECISE”
Generally, beliefs of this class tell you, “Taking this approach will make it more likely you’ll succeed.” So, if you expect the guidance of a belief will increase your odds of success – but not necessarily make success likely – you’re treating it as if it were imprecise.
EXERCISE 10
DETERMINING WHETHER BELIEFS
ARE APPROPRIATELY CLASSIFIED AS “IMPRECISE”
1. Refer to the list of beliefs you generated during Exercise 7A or Exercise 9. If neither of those lists are readily available, identify one or two beliefs that guide you in each of the areas below, for a total of about ten. Keep a record of those beliefs, many of which you’ll be examining in exercises to follow. Suggested areas from which to draw beliefs are:
• where you find joy
• where you find meaning and purpose
• your view of others – especially those whose opinions differ from your own
• your personal life
• your vocational/professional life
• advice/guidance you offer others
• political positions you advocate
2. Choose three or more beliefs you rely on for guidance and are interested in examining. If you have not already done so, use the questionnaire found in Exercise 7A to determine whether those beliefs are informative or reassuring.
3. Print the appropriate number of copies of the tool below.
4. Write each belief in the space containing the sentence stem, “I believe that . . .”.
5. Keeping the pertinent belief in mind, answer each of the questions in “A Tool to Help You Determine Whether a Belief is Properly Classified as ‘Imprecise’”
6. Record any thoughts, feelings, or questions that arise during this exercise in the space provided.
A TOOL TO HELP YOU DETERMINE
WHETHER A BELIEF
IS PROPERLY CLASSIFIED AS “IMPRECISE”
Belief to be examined: I BELIEVE THAT . . .
To determine whether the belief in question is an imprecise belief, determine if that belief satisfies criteria 1), 2) and 3), i.e. whether it
1) satisfies at least two of the four criteria below, i.e. whether it
a) makes directional (rather than specific) prediction(s) regarding relationships between phenomena b) describes the general (rather than precise) nature of purportedly related phenomena c) broadly (or only implicitly) describes the conditions under which relationships between phenomena are purported to hold d) engenders the expectation that relationships between phenomena will hold most – but not all – of the time
2) satisfies criteria e) and f), i.e., incorporates second-order precepts that
e) encourage believers to defend their beliefs against challenging observations f) lead believers to accept speculative post hoc explanations for predictive failures and other challenging observations without investigating those explanations
3) satisfies criterion g) or criterion h), i.e., incorporates belief-specific precepts that
g) weakly encourage, fail to encourage, or actively discourage seeking, generating, acknowledging, and promulgating challenging facts and arguments
h) inspire a laissez-faire attitude toward reexamination of findings when more sensitive instruments and/or more meticulous procedures become available
What thoughts, feelings, or questions arose during this exercise?