BELIEF: AN OWNER’S MANUAL
ARTICLE 17
THE PERIODIC TABLE
AND AMBIGUITY-VIEWPOINT INTERACTIONS
IN INFORMATIVE BELIEFS
As you may remember, I proposed in Article 1 that beliefs are best considered cognitive tools. I also suggested that they serve us well if they provide the guidance we rely on them for and poorly if they fail to do so.
In Articles 2-16, we explored some of the straightforward implications of that perspective. We learned to distinguish informative beliefs from reassuring beliefs and to determine whether we treat our beliefs as informative or reassuring. We learned to distinguish beliefs of varying degrees of ambiguity and to determine how ambiguous we assume our beliefs to be. We learned to identify the viewpoints of our beliefs and the viewpoints we assume our beliefs occupy. And we learned about the consequences of the errors we make when we fail to attend to each of these characteristics.
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN NEED, AMBIGUITY, AND VIEWPOINT
But there’s a subtler source of error than inattention to those individual characteristics: inattention to their interactions. The Periodic Table of the Beliefs, which I will send you upon request, was designed to draw attention to those interactions. (Please send requests for this document to barnet.feingold@hotmail.com.)
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PERIODIC TABLE OF THE BELIEFS
The Periodic Table of the Beliefs has five horizontal rows and eight vertical columns. In theory, it has forty cells, each of which serves as home to beliefs fulfilling one of two needs in one of five viewpoints with one of four degrees of precision.
The Periodic Table of the Beliefs locates informative beliefs on its left-hand side and reassuring beliefs on its right-hand side. Cells that provide homes to informative precise beliefs are at the leftmost edge of the table, while cells that provide homes to reassuring precise beliefs are at the table’s rightmost edge. Cells that are home to imprecise beliefs are immediately inboard of cells that are home to precise beliefs, while cells that are home to rules of thumb are immediately inboard of cells that are home to imprecise beliefs. Cells serving as home to informative catalytic narratives are to the left of the table’s center. Cells serving as home to comforting catalytic are to the right of the table’s center.
Viewpoints are arranged in the same manner on the left (informative) and right (reassuring) sides of the table. In both cases, the Existential Viewpoint provides the foundation, the Realist Viewpoint is immediately above the Existential Viewpoint, and the Ethical, Visionary, and Quest and Commitment Viewpoints are arranged, in that order, above the Existential Viewpoint.
The guidance that beliefs proper to each of the table’s forty cells supplies is the result of the primary qualities associated with need, viewpoint, and precision and the interactions of those qualities. This article and those that follow will describe those interactions, point out the errors that occur when those interactions are overlooked, and describe characteristics of The Periodic Table that draw attention to those interactions. These errors affect informative beliefs differently than reassuring beliefs. As such, I have chosen to devote this article to the effects of those errors on informative beliefs. I’ll be examining the impact of those errors on reassuring beliefs in Article 18.
CONSEQUENCES OF NEGLECTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AMBIGUITY AND VIEWPOINT IN INFORMATIVE BELIEFS
The first error we’ll be exploring occurs when we neglect the inherent ambiguity of higher-viewpoint informative beliefs. To make this easier to understand, let’s return to the drunken driving example from Article 14. As you may recall, the informative Realist Viewpoint belief about drunken driving was, “While, in 2009, a little over two percent of drivers were found to be intoxicated, over a third of those who died in vehicular accidents tested positive for alcohol.”
This Realist Viewpoint belief is (allegedly) a straightforward fact. It’s a precise belief about the nature of reality because it implicitly predicts that if the data collection procedures that produced that fact were repeated, they would yield nearly the same (precise) result. Those same data could also give rise to imprecise beliefs like, “Drunken drivers are more likely to die in traffic accidents.” They could inspire rules of thumb like “If you drink, don’t drive.” Or they could motivate catalytic narratives – stories about drinking-related tragedies. Thus, as you can see, the Realist Viewpoint can host beliefs of any degree of ambiguity.
The informative Ethical Viewpoint belief about drunken driving – “The number of persons who drive under the influence of drugs and alcohol is intolerable.” – cannot be reasonably translated as a precise prediction. The least ambiguous belief that can be derived from that statement is, “A majority of persons (or perhaps a majority of moral authorities) are likely to consider the prevalence of intoxicated driving to be a disgrace.” That statement, in a manner typical of imprecise beliefs, divides reality into a small number of categories – in this case, the disgraceful and the bearable. This example illustrates the principle that imprecise beliefs are the least ambiguous beliefs the Ethical Viewpoint is capable of hosting. Nothing prevents the Ethical Viewpoint from hosting rules of thumb (value-laden sayings about drinking and driving) or catalytic narratives (value-laden stories about the consequences of driving while intoxicated).
The informative Visionary Viewpoint belief about drunken driving – “The world would be better if drunken driving were less frequent” – draws attention to a significant issue without suggesting what might make things better. It makes neither precise nor imprecise predictions, functioning, rather, as a rule of thumb. Despite my best efforts, I have been unable to generate a Visionary Viewpoint belief that breaks this ambiguity barrier. I therefore humbly propose that rules of thumb are the least ambiguous beliefs the Visionary Viewpoint is capable of hosting. The Visionary Viewpoint can, of course, host catalytic narratives – inspiring stories about a world free of drunken drivers.
Finally, the Quest and Commitment Viewpoint belief about drunken driving – “I’m obliged to do my best to reduce DUI” – describes the sort of person the believer wishes to be. Since, from a committed believer’s point of view, that choice cannot be wrong, the answer to the question, “What am I called upon to do to achieve the improvement or perfection I envision?” is unfalsifiable. And, of course, Existential Viewpoint beliefs, which, through our choices, create “truth” and “value,” are also unfalsifiable (and thus catalytic).
In sum, the questions that higher-viewpoint beliefs address render such beliefs more ambiguous than lower-viewpoint beliefs. The precision of Positivist Viewpoint beliefs is unlimited. Ethical Viewpoint beliefs can be no more exacting than imprecise beliefs. The precision of Visionary Viewpoint beliefs cannot exceed that of rules of thumb. And neither Quest and Commitment nor Existential Viewpoint beliefs can be any more precise than catalytic narratives.
Thus, we inevitably err when we (a) treat an Ethical Viewpoint belief as if its guidance were as valuable or trustworthy as that of a precise belief, (b) treat a Visionary Viewpoint belief as if its guidance were as valuable or trustworthy as that of either a precise or imprecise belief, or (c) treat a Quest and Commitment Viewpoint or an Existential Viewpoint belief as if its guidance were as valuable or trustworthy as that of a rule of thumb, an imprecise belief, or a precise belief.
The implications of this line of reasoning are portrayed on The Periodic Table of the Beliefs by blackened cells. That blackening indicates that such cells are proper to beliefs that are more precise than their viewpoints allow. As such, they are unpopulated.
CONSEQUENCES OF NEGLECTING THE AMBIGUITY OF LOWER-VIEWPOINT BELIEFS ON WHICH HIGHER-VIEWPOINT BELIEFS ARE BASED
Neglecting the limited precision of allegedly informative higher-viewpoint beliefs leads us to place more faith in them than they merit. That’s a significant error in and of itself. But there’s another common oversight that intensifies that error: blindness to the fact that the precision of informative higher-viewpoint beliefs is limited by the precision of the lower-viewpoint informative beliefs upon which they depend. To use an example I’ve used before, imagine that you’ve heard some negative (Realist Viewpoint) things about a relative’s lover. If those rumors are specific and falsifiable, your (Ethical Viewpoint) conviction that this relationship bodes ill for your relative is likely to be an imprecise belief. On the other hand, if that (Realist Viewpoint) rumor is vague and unfalsifiable, your (Ethical Viewpoint) judgments about the goodness of your relative’s relationship are necessarily uncertain (i.e., rules of thumb or catalytic narratives).
More precisely, if Realist Viewpoint “facts” about any issue are rules of thumb, those “facts” cannot legitimately be used to justify Ethical Viewpoint beliefs about the goodness of current realities. If, as in the example above, Realist Viewpoint “facts” are catalytic narratives, those “facts” cannot legitimately support anything but other such narratives in the Ethical, Visionary, and Quest and Commitment viewpoints. Similarly, Ethical Viewpoint beliefs in the form of catalytic narratives can support nothing but equally ambiguous narratives in higher viewpoints.
The Periodic Table of the Beliefs hints at this reality through its arrangement of viewpoints and classes of precision. However, it relies on users to remember that higher-viewpoint informative beliefs can properly occupy cells directly above or to the more ambiguous side of lower-viewpoint beliefs that support them – never to the more precise side.
Ignoring this issue renders us vulnerable to confidently making baseless judgments about good and evil. Equally seriously, it renders us vulnerable to committing ourselves to Utopian visions as if their promises were clear and realizable, even though the beliefs that underlie such visions deserve no more confidence than rules of thumb or catalytic narratives.
BROKEN EGGS, OMELETS, AND OUTRAGE
I find the statement, “You have to break some eggs to make an omelet,” maddening. Such a statement, of course, is intended to portray the harm done in pursuit of Visionary/Quest and Commitment Viewpoint goals as unavoidable and inconsequential. But it’s full of hidden assumptions.
First, it assumes that the goal, like an omelet, is familiar and that the speaker has a detailed vision of the reality he or she wishes to achieve. Second, it assumes that the process of attaining that goal, like the process of making an omelet, is well-understood and oft-replicated. Third, it assumes that the speaker possesses the skills, tools, and resources needed to achieve his/her goals. Finally, it assumes that whatever may be harmed is as inconsequential and unfeeling as an unfertilized egg.
However, the pursuit of Visionary/Quest and Commitment Viewpoint goals violates every one of these assumptions.
First, advocates of such goals cannot have clear, detailed, comprehensive visions of the realities their proposed actions might create. Such actions, after all, inevitably lead us into terra incognita.
Second, the processes by which Visionary Viewpoint/Quest and Commitment goals are pursued are necessarily novel.
Third, the novelty of those processes precludes verifiable expertise and makes it impossible to know whether the tools and resources needed to achieve one’s goals are available.
Finally, although visionaries may be blind to the humanity of those with no place in their plans, the “infidels,” “counterrevolutionaries,” and “soulless brutes” they are willing to sacrifice in pursuit of their Utopian visions are sentient and precious.
Additionally, it’s clear that knowledge of what God wants is rare, and there’s no way to know who has it. As such, it’s safest to assume that no one possesses such knowledge and that those who claim to are dangerously overconfident.
It’s also clear that, despite our grand visions, no one has created a paradise on Earth. Although we have the tools to break all the eggs we want to, we don’t have the means to turn them into anything edible. All of our purges, slaughters, holocausts, genocides, inquisitions, show trials, jihads – these and all the other horrors we’ve committed in pursuit of heavens on Earth – have created immeasurable suffering without once having created the beatific realities they promised. Contemplating this dolorous reality, I am reminded of graffiti found, in 1991, on a statue of Karl Marx in Moscow: “Workers of the World, I am sorry.”
Tragically, Utopians find it easy to believe that their dreams are well-grounded, realistic, and achievable – that they can make their dreams real and that those dreams, when realized, will be every bit as wondrous as they imagine. That belief has justified all too much havoc, suffering, terror, and slaughter.
Ungrounded, misleading Utopian visions can be personal, too. I recall a wealthy medical specialist who decided his life would be perfect if he were wealthier. Thinking that multi-level marketing was the key to riches, he came to view conversations as opportunities to enlarge his multi-level marketing pyramid rather than as opportunities to engage in meaningful interaction. Ultimately, he alienated his colleagues by inviting them to his home for a “party” that was, in reality, a multi-level marketing presentation. If he’d been more appreciative of what he had and more realistic about his dreams, he might not have wasted so much time or squandered so much goodwill.
THE EFFECT OF BIASED LOWER-VIEWPOINT BELIEFS ON THE VALIDITY OF CONTINGENT HIGHER-VIEWPOINT BELIEFS: A BRIEF STUDY IN IRONY
There’s another error resulting from inattention to the interaction of ambiguity and viewpoint in informative beliefs: blindness to the ways that beliefs can discredit themselves.
As we know, the validity of higher-viewpoint informative beliefs depends upon the validity of the lower-viewpoint beliefs that inspire them. You can’t make a valid judgment about whether something’s good unless you have an accurate grasp of what it is. You can’t make a valid judgment about what might be better unless you have a reasonable grasp of goodness. And so on.
Consequently, any allegedly informative higher-viewpoint belief that biases the lower-viewpoint beliefs that underlie it (thereby compromising their accuracy) is self-discrediting! Such beliefs are like skyscrapers whose upper floors are made of material pilfered from their foundations.
Imagine that someone’s Quest and Commitment Viewpoint beliefs render them passionate about bringing a particular political program to fruition. If that commitment leads them to (a) create unrealistically rosy (Visionary Viewpoint) scenarios about the joy and justice that program could bring about, to (b) exaggerate the (Ethical Viewpoint) injustice and oppression of the realities the proposed program promises to remedy, or to (c) distort data to support their dark vision of contemporary life, their Quest and Commitment Viewpoint beliefs about their obligation to realize their Utopian vision are unworthy of respect.
The vertical arrangement of viewpoints in The Periodic Table of the Beliefs is intended to remind you of the degree to which higher-viewpoint informative beliefs rely on lower-viewpoint informative beliefs . . . and that it’s as wrong-headed to support higher-viewpoint beliefs with biased lower-viewpoint beliefs as it is to build a skyscraper on an unstable foundation.
EFFECTS OF INDIFFERENCE TO LOWER-VIEWPOINT BELIEFS THAT
GROUND HIGHER-VIEWPOINT BELIEFS
One final question about the relationship between lower-viewpoint and
contingent higher-viewpoint beliefs remains unanswered: “What is the status of
higher-viewpoint beliefs whose believers neglect the lower-viewpoint beliefs on which
they’re contingent?” As you’ll see below, it’s advisable to view such beliefs as
catalytic narratives. Here’s the line of reasoning that leads to that
conclusion:
1. Believers who neglect the lower-viewpoint beliefs that,
in theory, ground a higher-viewpoint belief inevitably neglect the
falsifiability of those lower-viewpoint beliefs.
2. Thus, such believers no answer to the question, “If I were wrong, how would
I know?”
3. As we learned in Article 11, beliefs for which such questions have no answer
operate as catalytic narratives.
4. But, as we just discovered, the precision of higher-viewpoint beliefs is
limited by the precision of the lower-viewpoint beliefs on which they’re built.
5. As such, when believers fail to examine the lower-viewpoint beliefs that
ground their higher-viewpoint beliefs, they transform those higher-viewpoint
beliefs – whatever their apparent precision – into catalytic narratives.
EXERCISE 17
Reread this article, frequently referring to The Periodic Table of the Beliefs. Wherever possible, generate and document examples of the principles discussed.